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NETWORK NEUTRALITY, BROADBAND 
DISCRIMINATION 
TIM WU* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Communications regulators over the next decade will spend 
increasing time on conflicts between the private interests of 
broadband providers and the public’s interest in a competitive 
innovation environment centered on the Internet.  As the policy 
questions this conflict raises are basic to communications policy, 
they are likely to reappear in many different forms.  So far, the first 
major appearance has come in the ‘‘open access’’ (or ‘‘multiple 
access’’) debate, over the desirability of allowing vertical 
integration between Internet Service Providers and cable 
operators.1  Proponents of open access see it as a structural 
remedy to guard against an erosion of the ‘‘neutrality’’ of the 
network as between competing content and applications. Critics, 
meanwhile, have taken open-access regulation as unnecessary 
and likely to slow the pace of broadband deployment. 
 
 
*
 Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School.  I am grateful 
for comments on this paper from Tom Nachbar, Lawrence Lessig, Mark Lemley, Glen 
Robinson along with participants at the 2003 Silicon Flatirons Conference and the 
2003 University of Ottawa Tory Law Speaker Series.  The ideas in this paper were 
aided by discussions of network neutrality questions with individuals at the Federal 
Communications Commission and Congress, including Jordan Goldstein, James 
Assey, Jessica Rosenworcel and Commissioner Michael Copps. 
 1. See generally Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical 
Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and 
Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2003), available at 
http://repositories. cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC02-035 (last visited Sept. 24, 2003); Glenn A. 
Woroch, Open Access Rules and the Broadband Race, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. 
DET. C.L. 719 (2002); Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1224-27 (2002); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End 
of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001); Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications 
Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 819 (2000); James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race 
for the Last Mile? A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE. 
J. ON REG. 39, 77-90 (2000). 
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This paper takes a more general perspective.  The questions 
raised in discussions of open access and network neutrality are 
basic to both telecommunications and innovation policy.  The 
promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge 
of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned 
environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or 
even a retail store.  Government regulation in such contexts 
invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the 
owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming 
available to end-users.  The same interest animates the promotion 
of network neutrality: preserving a Darwinian competition among 
every conceivable use of the Internet so that the only the best 
survive. 
Given the likely recurrence of these kinds of questions, this 
paper compares three general approaches to the regulation of 
broadband providers: structural remedies, a non-discrimination 
regime, and self- or non-regulation.  It questions, first, the merits 
of structural remedies like open access as a means for promoting 
network innovation in favor of less intrusive models.  While 
structural restrictions like open access may serve other interests, 
as a remedy to promote the neutrality of the network they are 
potentially counterproductive.  Proponents of open access have 
generally overlooked the fact that, to the extent an open access 
rule inhibits vertical relationships, it can help maintain the 
Internet’s greatest deviation from network neutrality.  That 
deviation is favoritism of data applications, as a class, over 
latency-sensitive applications involving voice or video.  There is 
also reason to believe that open access alone can be an 
insufficient remedy for many of the likely instances of network 
discrimination. 
The preferable framework for ensuring network neutrality, I 
argue, forgoes structural remedies for a direct scrutiny of 
broadband discrimination.  The link between anti-discrimination 
regulations and network innovation are as old as the Hush-a-
Phone2 and Carterfone3 decisions, which controlled AT&T’s efforts 
to destroy innovative network attachments.  The basic principle 
behind a network anti-discrimination regime is to give users the 
right to use non-harmful network attachments or applications, and 
give innovators the corresponding freedom to supply them.  Such 
a regime avoids some of the costs of structural regulation by 
 
 2. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
 3. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 31 F.C.C.2d 420 
(1968). 
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allowing for efficient vertical integration so long as the rights 
granted to the users of the network are not compromised. 
But might network neutrality be accomplished without any 
regulation at all?  Basic economic theory suggests that operators 
have a long-term interest coincident with the public: both should 
want a neutral platform that supports the emergence of the very 
best applications.  However the evidence suggests the operators 
may have paid less attention to their long-term interests than 
might be ideal.  A 2002 survey of operator practices conducted for 
this paper suggests a tendency to favor short-term results.4  In 
that year, evidence of a discrimination problem became clear from 
several sources, including consumer complaints about operators 
who ban classes of applications or equipment, like servers, Virtual 
Private Networks, or WiFi devices,5 and in filings at the Federal 
Communications Commission by application developers.6  The 
survey in this paper shows that operators indeed had 
implemented significant contractual and architectural limits on 
certain classes of applications.  Operators showed an unfortunate 
tendency to want to ban new or emerging applications or network 
attachments, like WiFi devices or Virtual Private Networks, 
perhaps out of suspicion or an (often futile) interest in price-
discrimination.  On the whole the evidence suggests that the 
operators were often pursuing legitimate goals, such as price 
discrimination and bandwidth management.  The problem was the 
use of methods, like bans on certain forms of applications, which 
are likely to distort the market and the future of application 
development.  In short, the recent historical record gives good 
reason to question the efficacy of self-regulation in this area. 
I don’t want to suggest that operators are somehow incapable 
of understanding their long-term interests.  Yet, when we return to 
the open access debate, one account of the utility of the debate is 
that it played an important informational role—the debate itself 
helped cable operators evaluate their long-term self-interests, and 
many have chosen to allow rival ISPs access to their networks, for 
 
 4. See infra Appendix. 
 5. Complaints about restrictions on broadband applications like filesharing 
applications or VPNs are common on discussion forums like DSL Reports. See, e.g., 
BROADBAND REPORTS, at 
http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,3775421;mode=flat;root=sware (July, 2002). 
 6. See Comments of the High Tech Broadband Coalition,  In re: Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities (filed 
June 18, 2002), available at http://www.itic.org/policy/fcc_020618.pdf; see also FCC 
Ex Parte Letter, Aug. 22 2003, available at 
http://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf. 
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a variety of reasons.7  Even strong believers in deregulation and 
the advantages of vertical integration recognize that incumbents 
may occasionally become set in their ways.8  In this respect, one 
of the functions of raising issues of broadband discrimination is to 
challenge broadband operators to ask whether applications 
restrictions are a good long-term policy.  Indeed many of the 
improvements in operator behavior in the year 2003 may be linked 
to the Federal Communications Commission’s increased oversight 
of this area. 
This paper encompasses a mixture of empirical and 
theoretical sections.  The first part of five is an effort to explain the 
relationship between several related concepts in this area: open 
access, broadband discrimination, and network neutrality.  
Network neutrality, as shorthand for a system of belief about 
innovation policy, is the end, while open access and broadband 
discrimination are the means.  I suggest that open access 
regulation, as a structural remedy to ensure network neutrality, is 
not ideally suited to that task.  A direct analysis premised on 
normative principle of network neutrality may provide a better 
means to discuss the harm in question. 
The second part develops the theoretical framework for a 
broadband discrimination regime.  It asks whether we can 
differentiate between justified and unjustified restrictions on user 
behavior, with particular reference to the restrictions seen in the 
survey in the third part.  The use of restrictions on classes of 
application to pursue bandwidth management and price 
discrimination is troubling when those restrictions might be 
pursued through less restrictive means.  The section also asks 
whether self-regulation is likely, and concludes that the threat of 
regulation might serve useful. 
The third part is a survey of the degree to which broadband 
operators restrict certain applications and favor others.  The study 
surveys the nation’s 10 largest cable operators and six largest 
DSL providers.  The results are mixed.  First, cable operators tend 
to employ far more contractual restrictions than do DSL operators.  
The contractual restrictions and network designs tend to favor, as 
a class, one-to-many applications development.  Second, there is 
a tendency to use restrictions on application classes to pursue 
goals such as price discrimination and bandwidth management. 
 
 7. For example, AT&T Broadband has recently begun to open parts of its 
network to ISP competition. See Peter J. Howe, Earthlink Debuts On AT&T Networks 
Offers High-Speed Internet Service, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2002, at C4. 
 8. See, e.g., Farrell & Weiser, supra note 1, at 33-36. 
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The fourth part shows what a workable principle of network 
neutrality would look like and what it would mean for the conduct 
of broadband providers.  It suggests that operators should have 
the freedom to “police what they own,” or act reasonably to control 
the local broadband network.  On the other hand, it suggests that 
that the Internet community (and, at some point, regulators) 
should view with suspicion restrictions premised on inter-network 
criteria.  A sample text of an anti-discrimination law is included to 
show how such a principle could be implemented.  Finally, the fifth 
and final part of this paper addresses several possible 
counterarguments to the network neutrality regime discussed in 
this article. 
 
I. NETWORK NEUTRALITY & OPEN ACCESS 
 
The relationship between concepts like open-access, network 
neutrality, and broadband discrimination may be unclear to the 
reader.  It is best to understand network neutrality as an end, and 
open access and broadband discrimination as different means to 
that end.  In this section we will examine both why network 
neutrality might be an attractive goal, and, how an open-access 
and broadband discrimination regime differ as means toward that 
end. 
 
A. The Case for Network Neutrality 
 
So what is attractive about a neutral network—that is, an 
Internet that does not favor one application (say, the world wide 
web), over others (say, email)?  Who cares if the Internet is better 
for some things than others?9 
The argument for network neutrality must be understood as a 
concrete expression of a system of belief about innovation, one 
that has gained significant popularity over last two decades.  The 
belief system goes by many names.10  Here we can refer to it 
generally as the evolutionary model.11  Speaking very generally, 
 
 9. More general arguments in favor of a network neutrality regime can be found 
in Lawrence Lessig & Tim Wu, FCC Ex Parte Letter, Aug. 22, 2003, available at 
http://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf. 
 10. A full treatment of the names given to evolutionary theories of innovation is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  Some adherents would ascribe such theories to 
economist Joseph Schumpeter, while in recent legal work the argument is stated as 
an argument over what should be owned and what should be free.  See generally 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 3-17 (2001). 
 11. See, e.g., John Ziman, Evolutionary Models for Technological Change, in 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 3 (John Ziman ed., 
WU FINAL ARTICLE NETWORK NEUTRALITY.DOC 4/23/2005  12:46 PM 
146 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. [Vol. 2 
adherents view the innovation process as a survival-of-the-fittest 
competition among developers of new technologies.  They are 
suspicious of models of development that might vest control in any 
initial prospect-holder, private or public, who is expected to direct 
the optimal path of innovation, minimizing the excesses of 
innovative competition.12  The suspicion arises from the belief that 
the most promising path of development is difficult to predict in 
advance, and the argument that any single prospect holder will 
suffer from cognitive biases (such as a predisposition to continue 
with current ways of doing business) that make it unlikely to come 
to the right decisions, despite best intentions. 
This account is simplistic; of interest is what the theory says 
for network design.  A communications network like the Internet 
can be seen as a platform for a competition among application 
developers.  Email, the web, and streaming applications are in a 
battle for the attention and interest of end-users.  It is therefore 
important that the platform be neutral to ensure the competition 
remains meritocratic. 
For these reasons, Internet Darwinians argue that their 
innovation theory is embodied in the “end-to-end” design 
argument, which in essence suggests that networks should be 
neutral as among applications.13  As network theorist Jerome 
Saltzer puts it: “The End-to-End argument says ‘don’t force any 
service, feature, or restriction on the customer; his application 
knows best what features it needs, and whether or not to provide 
those features itself.’”14  The Internet Protocol suite (IP) was 
designed to follow the end-to-end principle, and is famously 
indifferent both to the physical communications medium “below” it, 
and the applications running “above” it.15  Packets on the Internet 
run over glass and copper, ATM and Ethernet, carrying .mp3 files, 
bits of web pages, and snippets of chat.  Backers of an 
evolutionary approach to innovation take the Internet, the fastest 
 
2000); RICHARD NELSON, UNDERSTANDING TECHNICAL CHANGE AS AN EVOLUTIONARY 
PROCESS (1987). 
 12. In the legal field, Edmund W. Kitch’s The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) is often taken to exemplify this approach. 
 13. See J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/ publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf (last visited Oct. 
9, 2003). 
 14. Id. at 3. 
 15. The metaphors of “above” and “below” come from the fact that in a layered 
model of the Internet’s design, the application layers are “above” the TCP/IP layers, 
while the physical layers are “below.”  See ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER 
NETWORKS 39 (4th ed. 2002). 
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growing communications network in history, as evidence of the 
superiority of a network designed along evolutionary principles.16 
There is much to this debate, and I do not want to suggest 
that the discussion about the general merits of evolutionary 
innovation models are settled, nor are the debates over whether a 
neutral platform best stimulates competition among applications.17  
But sentiments like those I have just expressed have come to 
enjoy a broad normative following.  From this we can understand 
why preserving a neutral network might be taken as a suitable 
goal of Internet communications policy. 
 
 
 16. LESSIG, supra note 10, at 14 (“No modern phenomenon better demonstrates 
the importance of free resources to innovation and creativity than the internet.”). 
 17. For a recent work doubting the merits of open platform designs under some 
circumstances, see, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights In Emerging Platform 
Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615 (2000). 
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B. The Open Access Remedy and its Limitations 
 
Taking network neutrality as the goal, we can understand 
open access as one kind of remedy.  The term open-access is 
used in many different ways; it generally refers to a structural 
requirement that would prevent broadband operators from 
bundling broadband service with Internet access from in-house 
Internet service providers.18  Certain proponents, like Jerome 
Saltzer, Larry Lessig and Mark Lemley, make the logical link 
between open-access regulation and the preservation of a neutral 
Internet.  They argue that if cable operators are allowed to bundle 
ISP services with cable services, cable operators would be in a 
position to destroy the neutrality of the network by foreclosing 
competition among Internet applications.  As Lemley and Lessig 
put it, 
[T]here is, in principle, no limit to what a cable company could 
bundle into its control of the network.  As ISPs expand beyond 
the functions they have traditionally performed, AT&T or Time 
Warner might be in a position to foreclose all competition in an 
increasing range of services provided over broadband lines.  
The services available to broadband cable users would then be 
determined by the captive ISPs owned by each local cable 
company.  This design would contradict the principle that the 
network should remain neutral and empower users.  It further 
could constitute the first step in a return to the failed 
architecture of the old AT&T monopoly. 19 
Critics of this argument, like Phil Weiser, Jim Speta, and Glen 
Robinson, have, in the main, cast doubt on the claim that 
regulation is needed to prevent cable operators from foreclosing 
competition when it would be efficient, or ask whether network 
neutrality is an appropriate goal.20  But I want to raise a slightly 
different question.  If we agree with the normative goal of network 
neutrality, to what degree does the structural remedy of open-
access actually serve its interest?  Might we do better by targeting 
 
 18. The FCC, for example, has outlined three forms of open access remedy in 
ongoing open access rulemaking. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the 
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed 
Rule Making, 17 F.C.C.R.. 4798, ¶ 74 (2002) (discussing various models of open 
access regulation). 
 19. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 1, at 942-43. 
 20. See Speta, supra note 1, at 76; Farrell & Weiser, supra note 1, at 4-6; 
Robinson, supra note 1, at 1216-17. 
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network neutrality directly with questions of broadband 
discrimination? 
I believe there are several reasons to question the fit between 
open-access remedies and network neutrality.  First, the concept 
of network neutrality is not as simple as some IP partisans have 
suggested.  Neutrality, as a concept, is finicky, and depends 
entirely on what set of subjects you choose to be neutral among.21  
A policy that appears neutral in a certain time period, like “all men 
may vote”, may lose its neutrality in a later time period, when the 
range of subjects is enlarged. 
This problem afflicts the network neutrality embodied in the IP 
protocols.  As the universe of applications has grown, the original 
conception of IP neutrality has dated: for IP was only neutral 
among data applications.  Internet networks tend to favor, as a 
class, applications insensitive to latency (delay) or jitter (signal 
distortion).  Consider that it doesn’t matter whether an email 
arrives now or a few milliseconds later.  But it certainly matters for 
applications that want to carry voice or video.  In a universe of 
applications, that includes both latency-sensitive and insensitive 
applications, it is difficult to regard the IP suite as truly neutral as 
among all applications. 
This point is closely linked to questions of structural 
separation.  The technical reason IP favors data applications is 
that it lacks any universal mechanism to offer a quality of service 
(QoS) guarantee.22  It doesn’t insist that data arrive at any time or 
place.  Instead, IP generally adopts a “best-effort” approach: it 
says, deliver the packets as fast as you can, which over a typical 
end-to-end connection may range from a basic 56K connection at 
the ends, to the precisely timed gigabits of bandwidth available on 
backbone SONET links.  IP doesn’t care: it runs over everything.  
But as a consequence, it implicitly disfavors applications that do 
care. 
Network design is an exercise in tradeoffs, and IP’s designers 
would point out that the approach of avoiding QoS had important 
advantages.  Primarily, it helped IP be “downwardly” neutral as to 
the underlying physical media.  But this requires us to be more 
circumspect in our discussions of network neutrality.  IP’s 
neutrality is actually a tradeoff between upward (application) and 
 
 21. Cf. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-
400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (on the meaning of neutrality in the context of 
church and state). 
 22. Efforts to add quality of service functionality to the Internet protocol, such as 
the IETF’s DiffServ and IntServ’s approaches, have never been implemented to 
provide end-to-end quality of service on an IP network. 
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downward (connection) neutrality.  If it is upward, or application 
neutrality that consumers care about, principles of downward 
neutrality may be a necessary sacrifice. 
This returns us to the question of structural separation.  We 
have a public network that is indeed a great creative commons for 
data applications, but it is less so for any application that requires 
a minimum quality of service.  True application neutrality may, in 
fact, sometimes require a close vertical relationship between a 
broadband operator and Internet service provider.  The reason is 
that the operator is ultimately the gatekeeper of quality of service 
for a given user, because only the broadband operator is in a 
position to offer service guarantees that extend to the end-user’s 
computer (or network).  Delivering the full possible range of 
applications either requires an impracticable upgrade of the entire 
network, or some tolerance of close vertical relationships. 
This point indicts a strict open-access requirement.  To the 
extent open access regulation prevents broadband operators from 
architectural cooperation with ISPs for the purpose of providing 
QoS dependent applications, it could hurt the cause of network 
neutrality.23  By threatening the vertical relationship required for 
certain application types, it could maintain IP’s discrimination in 
favor of data applications.  More broadly, this argument shows 
that the concept of network neutrality cannot be taken as counsel 
against all vertical integration.24 
A second, and simpler, problem with open access from a 
neutrality perspective is that the structural remedy may also be an 
underinclusive means of ensuring network neutrality.  Competition 
among ISPs does not necessarily mean that broadband operators 
will simply retreat to acting as passive carriers in the last mile.  As 
the survey in this study shows, operators continue to have 
reasons to want to control usage of the Internet based on their 
status as broadband operators, regardless of ISP competition.  
Hence, open-access does not end the debate over whether 
broadband operators are capable of engaging in undesirable 
behavior from the perspective of the public network. 
For these reasons, this paper seeks to see if we might do 
better to address questions of network neutrality directly, through 
the remedial concept of “broadband discrimination,” rather than 
through structural solutions like open-access. 
 
 23. This might happen, for example, if an open-access regulation slowed the 
development of vertically integrated layer 2 / layer 3 architectures. 
 24. Ultimately, this line of argument echoes the economists’ point that efficiencies 
exist from vertical integration.  The point here is to show that principles of network 
neutrality lead to the same conclusion. 
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II. THE CONCEPT OF BROADBAND DISCRIMINATION 
 
The question of controlling what people do with their network 
services is hardly new to communications regulation.  It is as least 
as old as Hush-A-Phone, and the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of 
the 1934 Communications Act to find that the subscriber has a 
“right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are privately 
beneficial without being publicly detrimental.”25 
Nor is the prevention of discrimination a new topic in 
communications regulation.  Over the history of communications 
regulation, the Government has employed both common carriage 
requirements (similar to the neutrality regime discussed here) and 
limits on vertical integration as means of preventing unwanted 
discrimination.  The goal of this section is to further explain how a 
common carriage or anti-discrimination model might be better 
developed to address the current Internet environment. 
Why might thinking in discrimination terms be useful?  Only 
because it borrows from what is familiar to achieve new goals.  
What is critical to the study of discrimination regimes is the 
existence of both justified and suspect bases of discrimination.  
For example, in the employment context, where discrimination 
norms are most developed, employers are generally permitted to 
fire or refuse to hire individuals for a range of reasons, such as 
education-level, intelligence, and demeanor.26  The law implicitly 
recognizes that it is essential that the employer retain the freedom 
to fire incompetents and hire only those with necessary skills.  On 
the other hand, criteria such as race, sex, or national origin are 
suspect criteria of discrimination, but can only be justified by a 
bona fide rationale.27 
While discrimination among Internet applications is a different 
context, the framework of analysis can be usefully retained.  As 
the proposal in Part IV develops, it is possible to distinguish 
between classes of restrictions that should generally be allowable, 
and those that might raise suspicion.  Overall, there is a need to 
strike a balance between legitimate interests in discriminating 
against certain uses, and reasons that are suspect either due to 
irrationality or because of costs not internalized by the broadband 
operator. 
 
 25. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
 26. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2002) (codification of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 27. See id. 
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To get a better feeling for what a discrimination approach 
entails, it is helpful to map out some of the extremes of clearly 
permissible and clearly troublesome discrimination in the 
broadband context.  At one extreme, many of the usage or 
application bans surveyed are clearly justified.  For example, 
operators usually ban users from using applications or conduct 
that are meant to hurt the network or other users, like network 
viruses.28  It is true that this is a departure from network neutrality, 
because it disfavors a class of applications—those that are 
disruptive to the network.  Yet, it is clear that the operator has 
acted to solve a problem of a negative externality—the costs 
imposed by one user on others.  Few could or would argue that 
this is a bad thing. 
At the opposite extreme, the harm from totally unjustified 
discrimination is equally clear.  Leaving aside whether operators 
would actually act in this way, imagine that the nation’s broadband 
operators came to feel that IP “chat” programs were just a waste 
of time, and were able to use their control over the last mile to ban 
their use.29  Such discrimination has both a direct harm as well as 
several negative externalities.  The direct harm is obvious: existing 
broadband consumers who like chat programs lose the 
opportunity to use a valued application, while creators of chat 
programs lose whatever revenue opportunity chat programs 
create.  But the more interesting costs are the various losses of 
positive externalities.  Three stand out.  First, if chat programs 
have positive externalities for other network applications—say, if 
the chat program is middle-ware for a file-exchange program, as 
in the case of Aimster—dependent applications are hurt as well.  
Second, to the degree other applications depend on a critical 
mass of high-bandwidth users, they are hurt by potential 
subscribers who at the margin are not willing to pay for broadband 
without the chat programs.  Finally, to the extent chat programs 
have positive social externalities, like helping people to plan 
 
 28. An example from the Cox Acceptable Use Policy: 
You are prohibited from posting, transmitting or disseminating any 
information or software that contains a virus, Trojan horse, worm or other 
harmful program or that generates levels of traffic sufficient to impede 
others’ ability to send or retrieve information. Prohibited conduct of this type 
includes denial of service attacks or similarly disruptive transmissions, as 
well as transmissions containing other harmful or malicious features. 
Cox Communications Policies, Acceptable Use Policy, Cox Communications, Inc., at 
http://support.cox.net/custsup/policies/acceptableuse.shtml (revised Feb. 3, 2003). 
 29. For example, by screening chat program activity by TCP port number.  Such 
a restriction could be avoided, but it suffices for the example. 
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meetings or meet new boyfriends, the public suffers too.30  Thus, 
there are considerable potential costs from an irrational or 
unjustified ban on certain application types. 
These are the easy cases.  We next consider whether 
reasons like price discrimination and bandwidth management 
should justify discrimination among applications. 
 
A. Price Discrimination & Restrictions on Commercial Use 
 
As detailed in the survey below, nearly every operator places 
limits on “commercial” use, sometimes including limits on Virtual 
Private Networks, as well as limits on acting as a server.31  Why 
might an operator put such a restriction on usage?  Doing so 
obviously makes the service less attractive to consumers who 
might want to act in a commercial way, even in a fairly casual 
manner.32 
The simple answer is price discrimination.  That this is the 
case is not just intuition, but can be confirmed by company policy.  
As evidence we can consider Comcast’s reply in 2001 to a user 
who had complained about the ban on VPN usage on Comcast’s 
network: 
Thank you for your message. 
 High traffic telecommuting while utilizing a VPN can 
adversely affect the condition of the network while disrupting 
the connection of our regular residential subscribers. 
 To accommodate the needs of our customers who do 
choose to operate VPN, Comcast offers the Comcast @Home 
Professional product. @Home Pro is designed to meet the 
needs of the ever growing population of small office/home 
office customers and telecommuters that need to take 
advantage of protocols such as VPN.  This product will cost 
$95 per month, and afford you with standards which differ from 
 
 30. Conversely, as we will see in a second, if chat programs have negative 
externalities because they actually do waste everyone’s time, the operators may have 
done the world a big favor. 
 31. See, e.g., Cable Modem Service Subscription Agreement, Time Warner 
Cable, at http://help.twcable.com/html/twc_sub_agreement.html (last visited Mar. 12, 
2003) [hereinafter Time Warner Usage Agreement]. 
 32. Network design already discourages hosting activity, because most 
broadband services give asymmetric bandwidth (more downstream than upstream) 
and a dynamic, as opposed to fixed, IP address.  These design features preclude 
serious commercial website operation, but leave room for casual hosting operations, 
such as participating in a peer-to-peer network. 
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the standard residential product. 
 If you’re interested in upgrading . . . .33 
As the letter shows, Cable and DSL operators typically offer 
commercial packages at a considerable markup from basic 
broadband service.  For example, phone companies like Verizon 
or BellSouth offer T-1 lines at prices far higher than basic DSL or 
cable service.34  The goal is to exact a premium price from the 
customers who most desire the commercial service.  Allowing 
subscribers to basic service to operate hosting services might 
erode such profits. 
It is true that mainstream antitrust analysis has come to see 
price discrimination as generally uncontentious, or at least 
ambiguous.35  As between consumers and producers, it hurts 
some consumers and helps others, while raising the producers’ 
profits.  Yet this analysis can, and should, change as in the 
broadband context, because the practice of price discrimination 
may have external effects on the process of innovation and 
competition among applications.  That is to say, while price 
discrimination among applications may not be troubling from a 
static perspective (as between existing consumers and 
producers), it may have dynamic consequences, for the 
competitive development of new applications. 
We can see this in the present example of a ban on 
commercial operations.  The goal, as we’ve seen, is to maintain a 
customary markup on business services.  But the restrictions on 
the market for what can be termed commercial applications used 
on home connections come at a cost.  The direct effect of a ban 
on hosting is to make the connection slightly less valuable to the 
basic consumer, which presumably the operator takes into 
account in her pricing scheme.  But there are other costs that the 
operator may not internalize.  The bans on commercial use or 
acting as a server constrain the competitive development of 
applications that might rely on such a function.  In the Comcast 
letter example the problem was VPN applications, which typically 
can rely on end-users functioning both as clients and servers, and 
which can be classified as a commercial use.36  And it is also the 
 
 33. See Comcast VPN letter, Practically Networked, at http://www.practically 
networked.com/news/comcast.htm  (last visited Mar. 12, 2003). 
 34. A T-1 line, providing 1.5 mbps of symmetric data, is usually priced at over 
$1000 per month. 
 35. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 203-06 (2d ed. 2001). 
 36. “Servents” in Gnutella terminology. 
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case that hosting services may have positive social externalities 
not taken into account by the operator’s decision.  For example, 
VPNs may facilitate greater productivity among employees, a 
benefit that may be lost in their prohibition. 
Another major restriction that interests broadband operators 
is barring users from providing content to the public or running 
servers.  Why do broadband operators act in this way, if, again, it 
might lower the value of its service to its users?  One reason may 
be the price discrimination rationale discussed above.  Yet from 
the reports of cable operators themselves, a major goal is 
bandwidth management.37  The restrictions appear to be efforts to 
manage how users consume bandwidth by discriminating against 
types of usage. As the survey showed, such restrictions are more 
common on cable networks, which operate shared connections 
and tend to lack technological means for restricting individual 
bandwidth consumption.38  Hence, the restrictions, for example, on 
running “game” or “ftp” programs are most likely efforts to 
eliminate a potential source of bandwidth consumption. 
The goal of bandwidth management poses an even more 
difficult question than does price discrimination.  The goal of 
bandwidth management is, at a general level, aligned with 
network neutrality.  As discussed above, certain classes of 
applications will never function properly unless bandwidth and 
quality of service are guaranteed.  Hence, the absence of 
bandwidth management can interfere with application 
development and competition. 
There are good reasons to question whether price-
discrimination, without more, should be permissible grounds for 
allowing discrimination among applications.  As we have seen, 
such usage restrictions may harm consumer welfare without 
offering a public benefit.  This is particularly the case when there 
are less-restrictive means for engaging in price discrimination.  
Selling different tiers of service (low, medium, and high bandwidth) 
does not favor or discriminate against particular application types.  
In the presence of a means for differentiating among customers in 
a way that does not distort the process of competitive innovation, 
 
 37. See, e.g., JUSTIN PEARSE, UK shrugs off American broadband troubles, 
ZDNET NEWS.COM, at  http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,t269-s2077792,00.html (Mar. 
20, 2000). 
 38. More recent incarnations of the DOCSIS protocol attempt to add better QoS 
functionality, but implementation at this date seems to be scarce. See Cable 
Modem/DOCSISTM, CABLELABS, at http://www.cablemodem.com/faq (last visited Mar. 
13, 2003) [hereinafter CABLELABS, DOCSIS]. 
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we should view discrimination on the basis of application with 
suspicion. 
Similarly, while managing bandwidth is a laudable goal, its 
achievement through restricting certain application types is an 
unfortunate solution.  The result is obviously a selective 
disadvantage for certain application markets.  The less restrictive 
means is, as above, the technological management of bandwidth.  
Application-restrictions should, at best, be a stopgap solution to 
the problem of competing bandwidth demands. 
 
B. Self-Regulation and the Educational Properties of Regulation 
 
The previous sections show that broadband operators may 
want to discriminate amongst the uses of its network for various 
reasons.  We have also seen that there are a variety of 
justifications—some good and some not—for such restrictions.  
Even if the goal itself is legitimate, the method of achieving that 
goal may be suspect.  The question, then, is whether cable 
operators will self-regulate and come up with the best policies on 
their own, or whether regulation may be necessary. 
In this section I argue that while cable operators may come to 
understand that broadband discrimination is not in their best 
interest, both the threat of, or actual implementation of, anti-
discrimination regulation may otherwise serve a useful 
informational or educational function.  Like anti-discrimination 
legislation in other contexts, it may serve an educational function, 
forcing operators to ask whether the restrictions they draft are 
actually serving their interest in maximizing the value of their 
services. 
As a baseline, the attractiveness of broadband service is a 
function of the applications it offers the consumer.  Hence, any 
restriction on use will lower the value of the service, and 
consequently either the price the operator can charge or the 
number of customers who will sign up (assuming a negative 
demand curve).  To make this clear: if an operator operated a 
service that screened all uses except web-access alone it might 
be worth $30 to the average consumer, while a service that 
offered access to every kind of Internet application—including, 
say, the opportunity to get copyrighted music for free—might be 
worth $50.  The difference in the value to the consumer will affect 
the price the operator can charge. 
This basic point is captured by Joseph Farell and Philip 
Weiser’s argument that a “platform monopolist has a powerful 
incentive to be a good steward of the applications sector for its 
WU FINAL ARTICLE NETWORK NEUTRALITY.DOC 4/23/2005  12:46 PM 
2003] NETWORK NEUTRALITY 157 
platform.”39  The point reflects, as the authors stress, classic 
arguments from antitrust.  A monopolist may still want competition 
in its input markets, to maximize profit in the monopoly market. 
But it is easy for a steward to recognize that the platform 
should support as many applications as possible.  The more 
difficult challenge has always been the dynamic aspect: 
recognizing that serving a tangible goal—like controlling 
bandwidth usage—may affect the intangible status of the Internet 
as an application development platform.  Some of the restrictions, 
such as those on running various types of server, are applications 
that are now likely to be used by only a small minority of 
broadband users.  Their sacrifice may appear like a good cost-
saving measure. 
More generally, the idea that discrimination may not always 
be rational is a well-understood phenomenon.  In the employment 
context, the various discrimination laws have an explicitly 
educational function.  For example, an express purpose of age 
discrimination legislation is to force employers to reconsider 
stereotyped perceptions of the competency of the elderly in the 
workforce.40  Broadband operators may simply disfavor certain 
uses of their network for irrational reasons, such as hypothetic 
security concerns or exaggerated fears of legal liability.  
Additionally, a restriction may become obsolete: adopted at a 
certain time for a certain reason that no long matters.  Practical 
experience suggests that such things happen. 
For these reasons, anti-discrimination regulation or the threat 
thereof can also serve a useful educational function.  It can force 
broadband operators to consider whether their restrictions are in 
their long-term best interests.  And in the absence of law it can 
establish norms around discrimination that may preserve network 
neutrality over the long term. 
The events of the year 2003 provide evidence to support the 
utility of a regulatory threat in promoting desirable conduct.  Both 
Comcast and Cox Communications openly disavowed their old 
practices of placing bans on Virtual Private Networks, and filed 
documents with the FCC to that respect.41  The cable industry has 
 
 39. Farell & Weiser, supra note 1, at 21.  This they describe as the “internalization 
of complementary efficiencies, or ICE.” 
 40. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991) (“the 
ADEA is designed not only to address individual grievances, but also to further 
important social policies”). 
 41. See Comcast Corp., FCC Ex Parte Letter, May 9, 2002 (“the ‘VPN restriction’ 
about which certain parties have complained has been eliminated from and is no 
longer part of Comcast’s subscriber agreements and terms of service for its high-
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furthermore begun to publicly insist that it wants to avoid 
broadband discrimination in the future, stating, for example, that 
“Cable Believes in Open Connectivity for the Internet.”42 
There is the possibility that the current regulatory process has 
forced cable operators to rethink their practices and conclude that 
discrimination is not in their long term self-interest.  The process 
demonstrates the continuing utility of communications regulators 
in remaining appraised on potential problems of anti-competitive 
practices. 
 
III. A SURVEY OF BROADBAND USAGE RESTRICTIONS 
 
Have broadband operators tended to favor certain uses of the 
Internet?  To what extent?  The goal of this section is to answer 
these questions, to the extent possible, for broadband networks 
during the year 2002.43 
The study divides measures of favoritism and discrimination 
into two categories: contractual and architectural.  The study 
surveyed the network designs (to the extent that the information 
was available) and usage restrictions in subscriber agreements 
and incorporated acceptable use policies from the 10 largest cable 
operators (AT&T,44 Time Warner, Comcast, Cox Communications, 
Adelphia, Mediacom, Charter Communications, CableOne, 
Insight, and Cablevision), and 6 major DSL operators (Verizon, 
SBC, Qwest, BellSouth, Sprint and WorldCom).  A chart 
containing full results can be found in the appendix. 
The survey showed the following general results.  On the 
whole, broadband operators’ networks and usage restrictions 
favored the applications of the late 1990s (primarily the World 
Wide Web and other client-server applications), and disfavored 
 
speed Internet customers.”); Cox Enterprises Inc., FCC Ex Parte Letter, May 1, 2003 
(“Cox hereby informs the Commission that the language of that [VPN] provision has 
been changed. . .”). 
 42. NTCA, Cable Believes in Open Connectivity for the Internet, at 
http://www.ncta.com/legislative/legAffairs.cfm?legRegID=20; see also NTCA, Ex Parte 
Letter, Sept. 8, 2003 (arguing that network neutrality legislation is unnecessary 
because of cable’s commitment to non-discrimination.). 
 43. Unfortunately, nearly any feature of network design or policy can be 
described as a deviation from a “purely” neutral design.  Something as innocuous as 
the length of the IP packet header could, potentially, help or hurt certain applications.  
To avoid an exercise in the esoteric, the goal of this section is to study major, 
intentional deviations from neutrality that clearly favor certain application types over 
others. 
 44. At the time the survey was conducted, AT&T and Comcast were still 
operating independently. 
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more recent applications and usage, like home networking, peer-
to-peer applications, and home telecommuting. 
There are differences between cable and DSL operators.  On 
the contractual side, cable operators tended to impose far more 
restrictions on usage than do DSL operators.  Major differences 
exist with respect to the extent of restrictions on home networking, 
operation of servers, commercial use, and overuse of bandwidth. 
An illustrative example is the difference in attitudes toward 
home networking.45  At the extremes, then-Cable operator AT&T 
Broadband defined home networking as “theft of services” and 
threatened subscribers with civil and criminal penalties. 46  In 
contrast, DSL provider Verizon makes it clear in its service 
contract that home networking is permissible, as does Sprint.47 
There existed variation between individual cable operators 
and DSL operators on some of the restrictions.  On the cable side, 
AT&T Broadband and Comcast (later combined to form the 
nation’s largest cable operator), stood out for having the strictest 
usage restrictions.  AOL Time-Warner, Charter Communications 
and smaller operators CableOne and Insight Broadband had the 
least restrictions.  Among DSL operators, BellSouth stood out with 
the most restrictions, similar in extent to a cable operator.  Overall, 
perhaps the most “liberal” broadband provider was DSL provider 
Sprint.  Sprint has very few usage restrictions, tells subscribers in 
FAQs that they may run home networks, web servers, and 
promises users that they “will have complete unrestricted access 
to all content available on the Internet.”48 
On the architectural side, the outstanding deviation from 
neutrality in broadband networks today is the asymmetric 
bandwidth common across networks.  Other, future controls may 
include application specific controls, as the survey of equipment 
vendors’ offerings shows. 
 
A. Contractual Restrictions 
 
 
 45. Home networking refers to the practice of sharing a broadband connection 
amongst all of the computers in a home, as opposed to the single computer attached 
to the cable modem.  This usually requires the purchase of additional equipment, 
such as a home router. 
 46. AT&T Broadband Internet Subscriber Agreement, § 6(g), available at 
http://help.broadband.att.com/listfaqs.jsp?category_id=973&category-id=34 (last 
revised Dec. 5, 2001). 
 47. Verizon Online Internet Access, Terms of Service, available at 
http://www.verizon.net/policies/internetaa.asp (2003). 
 48. Sprint FastConnect DSL, Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http://csb.sprint.com/home/local/dslhelp/faq.html#gen16 (2003). 
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We first consider the individual types of restrictions found in 
usage agreements, focusing attention on restrictions that are likely 
to influence the development of certain application-types.  The 
following chart shows the 13 main types of restrictions along with 
the percentage of major cable operators and DSL operators who 
stated such restrictions: 
 
TABLE 1. MAJOR USAGE RESTRICTIONS 
 
RESTRICTION CABLE DSL 
Using a Virtual Private Network 10% 0% 
Attaching WiFi Equipment 10% 0% 
Making the Connection a Network End Point 10% 0% 
Using Home Networking 40% 0% 
Misusing IP Addresses 60% 0% 
Any Commercial or Business Use 100% 33% 
Operating a Server or Providing Public 
Information 100% 33% 
Overusing Bandwidth 100% 33% 
Reselling Bandwidth or Acting as an ISP 100% 33% 
Conducting Spam or Consumer Fraud 100% 100% 
Hacking or Causing Security Breaches 100% 100% 
Any Unlawful Purpose   100% 100% 
Any Offensive or Immoral Purpose 100% 100% 
 
The appendix indicates which operators in the survey 
implemented the restrictions above.  The following pages provide 
further details on the language of the most controversial 
restrictions: (1) providing information to the public or operating a 
server, (2) commercial uses, (3) Home Networking, and (4) WiFi 
network operation. 
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1. Restrictions on Providing Content 
 
Nearly every cable operator and one third of DSL operators 
restricted operating a server and/or providing content to the public. 
49
  This restriction has the greatest potential significance because 
it affects the broadest class of applications—those where the end-
user shares content, as opposed to simply downloading content.  
The potential breadth of server restriction can be seen from AT&T 
Broadband’s acceptable use agreement: 
[Subscriber may not] run programs, equipment or servers from 
the Premises which provide network content or any other 
services to anyone outside of the your home . . . .  Examples of 
prohibited programs and equipment include, but are not limited 
to, mail, ftp, http, file sharing, game, newsgroup, proxy, IRC 
servers, multi-user interactive forums and Wi-Fi devices.50 
Again, this restriction can be understood as favoring a “one-
to-many” or vertical model of application over a “many-to-many” or 
“horizontal” model.  In application design terms, the restriction 
favors client-server applications over peer-to-peer designs.51  If 
taken seriously, the inability to provide content or act as a server 
would serve to restrict a major class of network applications. 
Not all the restrictions are as broad as AT&T Broadband’s.  
More typical is a simple ban on servers, as seen in this example 
from Cox Systems: “Servers You may not operate, or allow others 
to operate, servers of any type or any other device, equipment, 
and/or software providing server-like functionality in connection 
with the Service, unless expressly authorized by Cox.”52  Others, 
like Charter Communications, name banned applications: 
“Customer will not use, nor allow others to use, Customer’s home 
 
 49. The exception is Time Warner.  See infra Appendix. 
 50. AT&T Broadband Internet Acceptable Use Policy, ¶ xiv, available at 
http://help.broadband.att.com/faq.jsp?content_id=1107&category_id=34 (revised July 
25, 2002). 
 51. The Internet’s most popular application of the early 1990s—the world wide 
web—followed a client-server design, where a single specialized, centralized server 
provides services to a large number of clients.  However, today an increasing number 
of applications use fully or partially decentralized designs.  Email was always partially 
decentralized, for example, and the many popular “chat” programs embody a design 
that technically requires the user to act as a server as well as a client.  Similarly, users 
who want to access a home computer from work (using, for example, rlogin) need to 
set up the home computer to act as a server.  Peer-to-peer application designs also 
ask home users to act both as a client and server. 
 52. Cox Systems, Acceptable Use Policy § 6, available at 
http://www.cox.com/iNetIncludes/policy/acceptable.asp (updated Apr. 28, 2003).  See 
also AT&T Broadband Internet Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 50. 
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computer as a web server, FTP server, file server or game server 
or to run any other server applications.”53  The narrowest form of 
server restriction is seen in the Verizon terms of service 
agreement: “You may not use the Service to host a dedicated or 
commercial server.”54  Finally, contrary to others, DSL provider 
Sprint suggests that consumers may, in fact, run a web server, 
based on the following excerpt from Sprint’s FAQ site: 
Q: Can I run a web server? 
A: Yes it is possible to set-up a web server using your Sprint 
FastConnect DSL service.55 
2. Bans on Commercial Use 
 
A second restriction with potential implications for application 
development is a limit on “commercial” or “enterprise” use of 
residential broadband connections.  Every cable operator and 
most DSL operators surveyed had some ban on using a basic 
residential broadband connection for commercial use. 
The broadest and most controversial of such restrictions 
barred home users from using “Virtual Private Network” (VPN) 
services, which are used by telecommuters to connect to their 
work network through a secure connection.  Cox Systems 
provides an example of a ban on Virtual Private Networks: “You 
agree not to use the Service for operation as an Internet service 
provider, or for any other business enterprise, including, without 
limitation, virtual private network usage, IP address translation, or 
similar facilities intended to provide additional access.”56  More 
typical bans on commercial use came in the following form, as 
seen in the Time Warner Subscriber Conduct provision in its 
acceptable use agreement: 
The ISP Service as offered and provided under this Agreement 
is a residential service offered for personal, non-commercial 
use only.  Subscrber will not resell or redistribute (whether for 
a fee or otherwise) the ISP Service, or any portion thereof, or 
otherwise charge others to use the ISP Service, or any portion 
thereof.  Subscriber agrees not to use the ISP Service for 
 
 53. Charter Communications Pipeline, Acceptable Use Policy § 1(A), available at 
http://www.chartercom.com/site/rules.asp#aup (last checked Oct. 8, 2003). 
 54. Verizon Online Internet Access, Terms of Service, supra note 47, at § 2.4(C). 
 55. Sprint FastConnect DSL, Questions & Answers, available at 
http://csb.sprint.com/ servlet/Faq/faq_category?category=DSLGenQuestions (2003). 
 56. Cox Systems, Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 52, at § 5. 
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operation as an internet service provider, for the hosting of 
websites (other than as expressly permitted as part of the ISP 
Service) or for any enterprise purpose whether or not the 
enterprise is directed toward making a profit.57 
Again, the limitations found in DSL restrictions were far less 
extensive.  For example, the BellSouth subscriber agreement 
mixed the restrictions on providing content and acting 
commercially as follows: “Subscribers may not provide public or 
commercial information over such [residential DSL] 
connections.”58 
 
3. Home Networking 
 
When home networking first became widespread in 2002, 
four of ten of the nation’s largest cable operators contractually 
limited the deployment of home networks.59  They did so by stating 
restrictions on the number of computers that could be attached to 
a single connection.  The strongest example of such a usage 
restriction in 2002 came from AT&T Broadband: 
THEFT OF SERVICE. Customer shall not connect the Service or 
any AT&T Broadband Equipment to more computers, either on 
or outside of the Premises, than are reflected in Customer’s 
account with AT&T Broadband. Customer acknowledges that 
any unauthorized receipt of the Service constitutes theft of 
service, which is a violation of federal law and can result in 
both civil and criminal penalties. In addition, if the violations are 
willful and for commercial advantage or private financial gain, 
the penalties may be increased.60 
A milder approach was taken by Aldelphia’s online FAQ: 
Can I network more than one computer? 
 
 57. Time Warner, Cable Modem Service Subscription Agreement § 5(a), 
available at http://help.twcable.com/html/twc_sub_agreement.html (last visited Oct. 8, 
2003). 
 58. BellSouth Internet Service, Acceptable Use Policies, available at 
http://home.bellsouth.net/csbellsouth/s/editorial.dll?fromspage=cg/legal/legal_homepa
ge.htm&categoryid=&bfromind=354&eeid=376138&eetype=article&render=y5ck= (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2003). 
 59. MediaOne, Comcast, AT&T and Adelphia.  Due to enforcement difficulties 
and the ongoing regulatory proceedings at the Federal Communications Commission, 
most of these restrictions have been rescinded. 
 60. AT&T Broadband Internet Subscriber Agreement, § 6(g), at 
http://www.attbi.com/ general-info/bb_terms.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). 
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Yes. Please check with a reputable computer electronics 
retailer for home networking solutions that are right for you. 
Adelphia will support a cable modem that is connected to a 
hub or router to the gateway or host computer. Adelphia does 
not install or support the network. Adelphia Power Link may not 
be connected to a broadcast server of any kind.61 
In contrast, some DSL operators in their agreements explicitly 
acknowledged that multiple computers could be connected to the 
DSL connection.  As Verizon’s agreement stated: “You may 
connect multiple computers/devices within a single home or office 
location to your DSL modem and/or router to access the Service, 
but only through a single DSL account and a single IP address 
obtained from Verizon Online.”62  Other DSL providers were 
vague.  For example, in BellSouth’s terms of service: “Unless 
otherwise specified in the BellSouth Internet Service subscriber’s 
pricing plan agreement, sharing of accounts and/or connections 
on unlimited usage plans with anyone other than immediate family 
members in the same dwelling is strictly prohibited.”63 
 
4. Restrictions on Wireless (WiFi) Networks 
 
In addition to restrictions on home networking, several cable 
operators signaled a particular interest in controlling the 
deployment of home wireless networks.  This is clearest with 
AT&T Broadband: They explicitly banned the connection of “Wi-Fi” 
equipment.64  The provider also made it a breach of the 
subscriber’s agreement to maintain a WiFi service that is available 
to outsiders.  “[It is a breach of the agreement to] resell the 
Service or otherwise make available to anyone outside the 
Premises the ability to use the Service (i.e. WiFi, or other methods 
of networking).”65 
 
B. Architectural Controls, Present & Future 
 
1. Present 
 
 61. Adelphia FAQ, Home Networking, at http://www.adelphia.com/high_speed 
_internet/faqs.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). 
 62. Verizon Online’s Terms of Service, § 2.5B, at http://www.verizon.net/ 
policies/internetaa.asp. 
 63. See BellSouth, Acceptable Use Policies, supra note 58. 
 64. AT&T Broadband Internet Acceptable Use Agreement, supra note 50, at ¶ 14 
(“Examples of prohibited . . . equipment include . . . Wi-Fi.”). 
 65. Id. at ¶ ix.  Cox Systems, Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 52, at 17, has a 
similar restriction. 
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Today, the principal deviation from network neutrality through 
architecture is, and continues to be, asymmetric bandwidth: that 
is, the practice of designing networks to provide more 
“downstream” bandwidth than “upstream.”  It is difficult to obtain a 
full set of data on the extent of asymmetry, because many cable 
operators do not make public the maximum bandwidth permitted 
by their networks.  However, from the few sources of data that are 
available, we find that there is greater asymmetry in cable 
networks than DSL—though the shared architecture of cable 
networks makes the significance of this fact unclear.  Published 
DSL rates included residential bandwidth with as low as 1:1 ratios, 
while the modal ratio is 6:1 ratios.66  The few cable networks with 
public data promised maximum bandwidth ratios ranging from 
5.3:1 (Time Warner / Earthlink) to as much as 12:1 (Cox 
Communications).67 
As others have recognized, allowing more downstream than 
upstream bandwidth obviously favors the development of 
applications that are one-to-many, or client-server in design.  
Applications that would demand residential accounts to deliver 
content as quickly as they receive it will do less well under 
conditions of asymmetric bandwidth. 
 
2. Future – Better Bandwidth Management or Application Layer 
Controls? 
 
It is difficult to predict what application controls broadband 
operators might implement in the future.  Yet future possibilities 
can be gleaned from the marketing efforts of equipment vendors 
who target the cable and DSL market.  Two trends can be briefly 
noted, though the full topic is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
First, over the last several years, several companies have 
begun to market equipment described to facilitate application-
based screening and control for broadband networks.  Two 
prominent examples are Allot Communications and Packeteer 
Communications.  The former markets a product named 
“NetEnforcer” to cable and DSL operators,68 promising to control 
problems from both peer-to-peer traffic and unauthorized WiFi 
 
 66. See infra Appendix. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Allot Communications Netenforcer® Data Sheet, at http://www.allot.com/html/ 
products_netenforcer_sp.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). 
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connections.69  Allot’s competitor, Packeteer, markets a similar 
product, named “PacketShaper,” described as “an application 
intelligent traffic management appliance providing visibility into 
and control over network utilization and application 
performance.”70  The company claims that the product is used on 
hundreds of University campuses, primarily to control peer-to-peer 
traffic.71  When this survey was conducted, despite the marketing 
efforts of both companies, there was no evidence of deployment 
by cable or DSL operators.  It is therefore impossible to conclude 
whether broadband operators will begin using technological 
means to facilitate restrictions on usage. 
Second, vendors of cable data equipment promise improved 
bandwidth management capabilities as between individual 
customers on cable networks.72  This is the promise of the 
DOCSIS73 1.1 and 2.0 standards, which are an update to the 
current DOCSIS 1.0 standard in use today.74  As the new 
equipment is not yet widely deployed, these claims or their impact 
cannot be verified. 
 
C. Conclusions & Evidence of Enforcement 
 
What, generally, can be concluded from this survey?  On the 
one hand, there is no broad effort to ban everything that might be 
said to threaten the interests of cable and DSL operators.  For 
example, cable operators have not now barred streaming video, 
despite the potential to compete with cable television, and despite 
Dan Somers’ famous comment that “AT&T didn’t spend $56 billion 
to get into the cable business to have the blood sucked out of [its] 
 
 69. Jim Barthold, Allot looks to help servers with bandwidth congestion problems, 
TELEPHONY.ONLINE.COM,  available at 
http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom_allot_looks _help/index.htm (Dec. 3, 2002). 
 70. Packeteer, at http://www.packeteer.com/products/packetshaper.com (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2003). 
 71. Gwendolyn Mariano, Schools declare file-swapping truce, CNET NEWS.COM, 
at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-859705.html?tag=rn (Mar. 14, 2002). 
 72. See, e.g., http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/779/servpro/solutions/cable (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2003). 
 73. DOCSIS stands for Data Over Cable Service Interface Specifications.  See 
Seven Cable Modem Manufacturers Seek DOCSIS Certification, CABLELABS, at 
http://www.cablelabs.com/news/newsletter/SPECS/specnewsaug/news/pgs/story2.ht
ml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). 
 74. For an explication of the claims of DOCSIS 1.1 and 2.0, see CABLELABS, 
DOCSIS, supra note 38. 
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veins.”75  This conclusion is reinforced by the general perception 
that broadband access is not substantially limited. 
To what degree are these usage restrictions enforced?  While 
there is little formal data on enforcement patterns, there exists 
anecdotal evidence of enforcement on websites like DSL 
Reports,76 which are dedicated to users complaining about 
broadband service and usage restrictions.  Some examples of 
enforcement include the enforcement of monthly or daily 
bandwidth limits through a threatening to terminate or restrict the 
accounts of users who use too much bandwidth in a single month.  
For example, Cox Cable in November 2002 sent letters to users 
who downloaded more than 2 gigabytes of bandwidth per day, or 
30 gigabytes of bandwidth per month.77  Other cable operators, 
though no DSL providers, have suggested similar policies may be 
on their way.78  In addition, broadband consumers have 
complained of efforts to enforce specific bans on applications, 
such as threats to enforce contractual limits on VPN operations79 
and users who run file-sharing applications.80 
 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR NETWORK NEUTRALITY 
 
Recognizing that discrimination in broadband service is a 
potential problem is one thing; constructing an approach to 
dealing with it, is another.  The open-access proposal, as we saw 
earlier, advocated structural separation between Internet service 
providers and broadband operators.  This approach has the 
advantage of simplicity, but it has the disadvantage of retarding 
potential efficiencies of integration.  This approach also may fail to 
deter other forms of discrimination. 
What follows is a proposed antidiscrimination principle (a rule, 
only if necessary).  The effort is to strike a balance: to forbid 
 
 75. See David Lieberman, Media Giants’ Net Change Establish Strong Foothold 
Online, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 1999, at B3 (Dan Somers was CEO of AT&T 
Broadband at the time the comment was reported). 
 76. See BROADBAND REPORTS.COM, at http://www.dslreports.com (Mar. 2002). 
 77. See Karl Bode, Defining Gluttony: Cox Cable Gets Specific, at 
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/23465 (Nov. 12, 2002). 
 78. John Borland, ISP download caps to slow swapping? CNET NEWS.COM, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-975320.html (Nov. 26, 2002). 
 79. Practically Networked Earthweb, VPN Comcast Letter, at 
http://www.practicallynetworked.com/news/comcast.htm. (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). 
 80. Many users have accused cable operators of blocking specific file-sharing 
applications like KaZaa, through port blocking, though the reports are unverified.  See, 
e.g., RoadRunner Blocking kaZaA, ZEROPAID.COM, at 
http://www.zeropaid.com/news/articles/auto/ 
07142002a (July 13, 2002). 
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broadband operators, absent a showing of harm, from restricting 
what users do with their Internet connection, while giving the 
operator general freedom to manage bandwidth consumption and 
other matters of local concern.  The principle achieves this by 
adopting the basic principle that broadband operators should have 
full freedom to “police what they own” (the local network) while 
restrictions based on inter-network indicia should be viewed with 
suspicion. 
This non-discrimination principle works by recognizing a 
distinction between local network restrictions, which are generally 
allowable, and inter-network restrictions, which should be viewed 
as suspect.  The principle represents ultimately an effort to 
develop forbidden and permissible grounds for discrimination in 
broadband usage restrictions. 
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A. Let Operators Police What They Own 
 
Broadband carriers are members of two networks.  They are 
each members of a local network, which they own and manage 
individually.  They are also members of the inter-network, which 
they collectively manage with other service providers. 
 
FIGURE 1: BROADBAND CARRIERS, MEMBERS OF TWO NETWORKS 
 
Local
network
Internet
DSLAM /
CMTS
HFC/
Local Loop
Peer Router
Local Broadband Network
Inter-Network
End-Users
 
Once we recognize that carriers are engaged in a collective 
management scheme, the origin of the externalized cost problem 
described above becomes clear.  The effects of local network 
restrictions will, usually, affect only the network run by a single 
service provider.  Such restrictions moreover, are necessary for 
good network management.  In contrast, by definition, restrictions 
at the inter-network layer or above will always affect the entire 
network, and can create externality problems. 
 
B. The Neutrality Principle 
 
What follows is an example of a network neutrality law: 
 
§___Forbidding Broadband Discrimination 
 
(a) Broadband Users have the right reasonably to use their 
Internet connection in ways which are privately beneficial 
without being publicly detrimental. Accordingly, Broadband 
Operators shall impose no restrictions on the use of an 
Internet connection except as necessary to: 
 
(1)  Comply with any legal duty created by federal, state or 
local laws, or as necessary to comply with any 
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executive order, warrant, legal injunction, subpoena, or 
other duly authorized governmental directive; 
(2) Prevent physical harm to the local Broadband Network 
caused by any network attachment or network usage; 
(3) Prevent Broadband users from interfering with other 
Broadband or Internet Users’ use of their Internet 
connections, including but not limited to neutral limits 
on bandwidth usage, limits on mass transmission of 
unsolicited email, and limits on the distribution of 
computer viruses, worms, and limits on denial-of 
service-or other attacks on others; 
(4) Ensure the quality of the Broadband service, by 
eliminating delay, jitter or other technical aberrations; 
(5) Prevent violations of the security of the Broadband 
network, including all efforts to gain unauthorized 
access to computers on the Broadband network or 
Internet; 
(6) Serve any other purpose specifically authorized by the 
Federal Communications Commission, based on a 
weighing of the specific costs and benefit of the 
restriction. 
 
(b) As used in this section, 
 
(1) “Broadband Operators” means a service provider that 
provides high-speed connections to the Internet using 
whatever technology, including but not limited to cable 
networks, telephone networks, fiber optic connections, 
and wireless transmission; 
(2) “Broadband Users” means residential and business 
customers of a Broadband Operator; 
(3) “Broadband Network” means the physical network 
owned and operated by the Broadband Operator; 
(4) “Restrictions on the Use of an Internet Connection” 
means any contractual, technical, or other limits 
placed with or without notice on the Broadband user’s 
Internet Connection. 
 
This law expressed the inter-network neutrality principle, 
operationally, as a non-discrimination rule.  As the analysis above 
recognized, the concept of a total ban on network discrimination is 
counterproductive.  Rather, we need distinguish between 
forbidden grounds of discrimination, those that distort secondary 
markets, and permissible grounds, those necessary to network 
administration and harm to the network. 
Reflecting the dual-network membership just described, it will 
be inter-network criteria of discrimination that cause concern.  In 
technical terms, this means discrimination based on IP addresses, 
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domain name, cookie information, TCP port, and others as we will 
describe in greater detail below.  Hence, the general principle can 
be stated as follows: absent evidence of harm to the local network 
or the interests of other users, broadband carriers should not 
discriminate in how they treat traffic on their broadband network 
on the basis of inter-network criteria. 
The negative inference (expressed most clearly in exceptions 
(a)(3) and (4)) is that operators generally may discriminate in their 
treatment of traffic on the basis of local network criteria.  In 
technical terms, this means imposing restrictions on the basis of 
what network engineers call “link” or “layer 2” information, like 
bandwidth, jitter, or other local Quality of Service indicia. 
 
C. In Practice: Online Gaming 
 
Popular online gaming applications81 like Everquest, 
Asheron’s Call, or Online Quake tend to be bandwidth intensive, 
particularly compared with episodic applications like email.  As 
seen above, concerned broadband carriers have therefore been 
inclined to restrict the usage of such applications.  However, with 
the neutrality principle in mind, we can distinguish between a 
“better” and a “worse” way for this to happen. 
First, in today’s environment, a broadband carrier could block 
traffic from gaming sites.  It could do it either by enforcing a 
contractual provision in a usage agreement, or in the future, using 
its control of the local network to block traffic from gaming sites 
based on either application information, or the IP address of the 
application provider.82  Some carriers might elect, for a given 
supplemental fee, to remove the filter for specified users. 
Under the neutrality principle here proposed, this approach 
would be frowned upon.  Instead, a carrier concerned about 
bandwidth consumption would need to invest in policing 
bandwidth usage, not blocking individual applications.  Users 
interested in a better gaming experience would then need to buy 
more bandwidth—not permission to use a given application. 
 
 81. Also commonly referred to as “Massively Multiple Online Games,” or MMOGs. 
 82. For an explanation of how a broadband carrier would do so, see, e.g., The 
Cisco Content Delivery Network Solution for the Enterprise, Cisco White Paper (Apr. 
2002), available at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/so/neso/ienesv/cxne/cdnen_wp.htm; See also 
Cosine Communications., Digital Subscriber Lines and Managed Network-based 
Services: A Perfect—and Profitable—Marriage, White Paper, available at 
http://cnscenter.future.co.kr/ resource/rsc-center/vendor-wp/cosine/dslwp.pdf. 
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The neutrality of such control would prevent the distortion in 
the market for Internet applications.  If carriers choose to block 
online games in particular, this gives a market advantage to 
competing applications that have not been blocked.  But if 
broadband carriers only police bandwidth, the result is an even-
playing field.  It may be that the expense of more bandwidth leads 
people to choose different ways to spend their money.  But if so, 
that represents a market choice, not a choice dictated by the 
filtering policy of the broadband carrier. 
 
D. Borrowing from Well-Established Categories 
 
One advantage of the proposal is that it relies on well-
established legal and technological criteria to achieve its 
consumer-welfare goals.  Respectively, it borrows from principles 
of harm requirements and non-discrimination familiar to lawyers, 
along with a local/inter-network distinction that is fundamental to 
Datacom networks. 
 
1. The Harm Requirement 
 
In the telephony context, the “foreign attachment” problem 
discussed above was addressed by a “harm” rule; that is, a rule 
barring the Bells from preventing attachment of equipment unless 
harm to the network could be shown.  Its origins are found in the 
Hush-a-Phone case, where the FCC ordered Bell to allow 
telephone customers to attach devices that “[do] not injure . . . the 
public in its use of [Bell’s] services, or impair the operation of the 
telephone system.”83 
In the broadband context, it is discrimination against certain 
content and applications that is the major problem.  But the 
practice of requiring public harm to justify restrictions can be 
usefully employed. 
 
2. Local/Inter-Networking 
 
Finally, on the technological side, the distinction between 
inter-networking and local networking is very well established in 
the Datacom industry.  While the distinction is best reflected, and 
 
 83. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. AT&T, 22 FCC 112, 114 (1957).  This led in turn to 
the broader Carterfone decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), and finally Part 68, which 
adopted a protective circuitry approach to protecting the telephone network, see 47 
CFR §68 et seq. 
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usually discussed, in the context of the OSI network reference 
model (as the difference between layer 2 and layer 3 networks),84 
it is in fact independent of OSI.  As a practical matter, different 
physical equipment and different protocols run the different 
networks.  In a given network, “switches” run local networks, while 
“routers” collectively manage the layer 3 network.  Services can 
be offered at both levels—for example, VPNs and telephony can 
be offered either as a layer 2 service or as a layer 3 service. 
In addition, other schema used to describe network layers 
embody the same, fundamental, local / inter-network distinction.  
For example, the TCP/IP network model maintains a distinction 
between the “link” layer and the “network” layer.  This is exactly 
the same distinction as the layer 2/layer 3 distinction in the OSI 
model, and the local/inter-network distinction more generally.  
Again, this is no surprise, because virtual description simply 
reflects the physical network design.  The existence and 
pervasiveness of the local / inter-network distinction makes it a 
natural dividing line for reasonable restrictions on use. 
 
V. OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED NETWORK NETRALITY REGIME 
 
Before concluding, it is useful to consider some objections 
and challenges to the proposed network neutrality regime.  We 
consider (1) whether it overly interferes with broadband carriers’ 
ability to earn a return on their infrastructure investment, (2) 
whether local restrictions can be used to achieve the same 
problems as inter-network control, and (3) whether the principle 
interferes with administration of Internet addressing. 
 
A. Return on Investment 
 
First, does the neutrality principle restriction overly impinge on 
the ability of broadband carriers to earn a return from their 
infrastructure investments?  While a full analysis of broadband 
economics is beyond the scope of this proposal, we can 
nonetheless suggest that the neutrality principle is unlikely to 
interfere with the special advantages that a carrier gains from 
building its own infrastructure. 
The simple answer is that investing in a local network 
infrastructure creates its own rewards, as it creates particular 
advantages in the offering of network services.  We can see this 
clearly by considering the particular example of Virtual Private 
 
 84. Cf. ANDREW TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 10-18 (4th ed. 2002). 
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Networks under the neutrality principle.  A broadband operator 
who owns the local infrastructure has a natural advantage in 
offering local VPN services.  The advantage comes from the fact 
that they can offer service level guarantees that cannot be 
provided on a shared network.  Nothing in the neutrality principle 
would prevent a broadband operator from being in the unique 
position to sell such services. 
But the principle would prevent operators from blocking use of 
Internet VPNs – that is, VPNs that used the Internet to reaches 
sites that no single local network can encompass.  For example, a 
home user on the East Coast will almost certainly need to use an 
Internet VPN to connect to his business on the West Coast.  In 
offering this service, a broadband operator is in the exact position 
as any other Internet VPN provider.  Restricting use of Internet 
VPNs should therefore not be allowed, to preserve undistorted 
competition for this application. 
 
B. Can Local Control Disrupt Application Markets? 
 
Some might observe that the local and inter-network are 
interdependent in certain ways.  Won’t broadband operators 
simply use their control over the local network to achieve the 
same distortion of application markets? 
No rule can perfectly stamp out all undesirable behavior.  The 
point of the network neutrality principle is to make interference 
with the application markets much harder.  Without the ability to 
discriminate on the basis of the origin of a packet or the 
application being used, the broadband carrier is left with the far 
blunter tools of local restrictions. 
It might be argued that the address resolution protocol 
(ARP)85 could be used to achieve the same goals as IP-address 
filtering, since the job of ARP on a typical network is to convert IP 
addresses into Ethernet MAC addresses.  But, in fact, a 
broadband carrier manipulating ARP could only succeed in 
making his own users unreachable.  The ARP-cache only holds 
the information to match up local physical addresses with local IP 
addresses.  ARP has no idea how to stop a user from reaching a 
specific IP address, other than making that user unreachable.  
The example shows, in fact, the power of limiting a broadband 
carrier to local control. 
 
C. The Need to Administer IP 
 
 85. Described in IETF RFC 826, available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1027.txt. 
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Finally, some might point out that broadband carriers need 
some control over the Internet Protocol side of their network.  
They must, for example, be able to allocate static and dynamic IP 
addresses, maintain routing tables, and so on.  Does the network 
neutrality principle interfere with this? 
The point of the neutrality principle is not to interfere with the 
administration of the Internet Protocol side of a broadband 
carrier’s network.  It is, rather, to prevent discrimination in that 
administration.  Since it is phrased as a non-discrimination 
principle, a negative inference is that most aspects of IP 
administration can be conducted without concern.  For example, 
the allocation and administration of IP addressing should not pose 
any discrimination problems, so long as the administration of such 
addresses is in an even-handed manner.86 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this paper was to make an initial case for a 
broadband discrimination regime as an alternative to the structural 
remedy of open access to achieve the goal of network neutrality.  
At this point, the newness of the concept means much 
unavoidable vagueness as to its operation.  It is easier to point out 
examples of application discrimination that seem unjustified than 
to elucidate a standard that nearly separates the legitimate from 
the suspect.  For example, there remains much work to better 
define what the concepts of network neutrality and discrimination 
would fully entail as a regulatory matter, or even as a regulatory 
threat.  Should neutrality be defined by IETF standards?  The 
intuitions of network theorists?  Government definition?  Any 
workable regime designed to achieve network neutrality will need 
a more precise conception of this and other matters.  
Nonetheless, the hope is that the general framework described 
here might serve to begin the effort to discourage the most blatant 
or thoughtless disfavoring of certain application types through 
network design. 
 
 
 86. In today’s environment, the scarcity of IPv4 addresses does appear to justify 
a form of discrimination: charging more for static addresses, than dynamic addresses.  
This forms a good example of “permissible” discrimination. 
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UPSTREAM / DOWNSTREAM BANDWIDTH RATIOS 
    
PROVIDER BANDWIDTH BANDWIDTH  
NAME DOWN (K) UP (K) RATIO 
QWEST 256 256 1:01 
 640 256 2.5:1 
SPRINT 256 96 2.66:1 
 512 128 4:01 
VERIZON 1.5M 256 6:01 
 768 128 6:01 
 1.5M 128 12:01 
SBC 384 128 3:01 
BELLSOUTH 1.5M 256 6:01 
WORLDCOM 1.5M 256 6:01 
 384 128 3:01 
AT&T BB 1.5M 256 6:01 
 3M 384 8:01 
TIME WARNER 2 384 5.33:1 
COX 3M 256 12:01 
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